Remote arbitration hearings

[Video] Remote arbitration hearings could be your next best friend.

Video touches on security, control panel, controlling screen, private breakout rooms, exhibits, and witnesses.

SCOTUS age discrimination decision - video

[Video] A US Supreme Court age discrimination case holds that for federal employees, "any" discrimination can establish liability. However "but-for" causation required for a tangible remedy. Babb v. Wilkie (US Supreme Court 04/06/2020) (8-1) [PDF].

This decision was a victory for the employee, yet it was a hollow victory indeed.

Protocol for Remote Hearings

Here is my Protocol for Remote Hearings. You can also view and download a PDF.

     I have a Zoom Pro Level license, and am available to conduct remote arbitration hearings.

     This Protocol for Remote Hearings explains the use of Zoom for conducting a remote hearing. Once such a hearing is agreed upon, the arbitrator will issue precise instructions tailored to the specific case.

Cost: There is no added cost to the parties or to anyone participating in the hearing. Participants do not need to register with Zoom or to have a Zoom license.

Hardware: Use a PC, Mac, Linux, iOS, or Android. It is best to use a desktop, laptop, or tablet that has a webcam, and to have a DSL or good Wi-Fi connection. You can also use a smartphone or a voice-only telephone.

Initiating the hearing: The arbitrator will email a link to click in order to enter the hearing, along with a password. This will go to each person who will be attending the hearing – the advocates, each person on each side's team, and the witnesses.

When the hearing begins, each participant will be able to view all other participants, except for any participant using a voice-only telephone.

Physical locations: Participants can be anywhere: all together in one place, in separate places for the employer and union, each person in a separate place, or any combination of these.

Security: Participants will receive a password which should not be shared with others. Zoom meetings are encrypted. If the parties agree to have the arbitrator record the hearing, the recording will be saved on the arbitrator's local computer.

Private breakout rooms: The arbitrator will create a set of private breakout rooms – at least one for the Employer and one for the Union. During breaks, the arbitrator can assign each participant to a private breakout room where only those individuals can see each other and speak to each other.

Witnesses: If desired, each witness can be sequestered by having the arbitrator place each witness in a separate breakout room, and the arbitrator can bring the witness into the hearing when needed. The arbitrator will prepare special instructions for the witnesses.

Exhibits: Parties should agree on a method for submitting and exchanging exhibits, such as using a set of joint exhibits and emailing them to the arbitrator prior to the hearing. If a new exhibit needs to be introduced during the hearing, Zoom allows participants to transmit computer files to the other participants.

Recording: Parties should agree on whether or not the arbitrator will record the hearing. Any recording will be saved on the arbitrator's local computer (rather than in the cloud).

Pre-hearing practice: The arbitrator recommends that the parties participate in a complimentary practice session a week or two before the scheduled hearing to make sure everyone is familiar with the Zoom features.

NLRB Resumes Representation Elections

Press release from the NLRB:

WASHINGTON, DC – April 1, 2020 – The National Labor Relations Board will not extend its temporary suspension of Board-conducted elections past April 3, 2020 and will instead resume conducting elections beginning Monday, April 6, 2020.  On March 19, 2020, because of the extraordinary circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the NLRB had ordered the temporary suspension of all Board-conducted elections through April 3, 2020.  

As explained when ordering the suspension, the Board took the extraordinary action to ensure the safety of Agency employees and members of the public involved in elections. At the time, several of the NLRB’s regional offices had been closed and other locations were operating with limited staffing such that the Board did not believe it was possible to effectively conduct elections.

Chairman John F. Ring stated: “Conducting representation elections is core to the NLRB’s mission, and ensuring elections are carried out safely and effectively is one of our primary responsibilities. Two weeks ago, when the Board made the difficult decision to suspend elections, the developing situation made it impossible to ensure the safety of our employees or the public. With many regional offices closed and most employees teleworking, the Board was not confident that any type of election could be run effectively. Based on these concerns, the Board determined that a two-week suspension would provide the General Counsel, who is delegated authority to supervise the regional offices, which conduct elections on the Board’s behalf, the opportunity to fully review the logistics of the election procedures in light of the unprecedented situation. The General Counsel now has advised that appropriate measures are available to permit elections to resume in a safe and effective manner, which will be determined by the Regional Directors. We appreciate the patience and understanding of all NLRB stakeholders during this challenging time.” 

Duty to bargain in emergency situations - NLRB Memo

Here’s a Memo from the NLRB’s General Counsel on the Duty to bargain in emergency situations. [Also by PDF]

§1981 cases require but-for causation

[Video] Entertainment Studios Network (ESN), owned by an African-American, sued Comcast, a cable television conglomerate, claiming that Comcast's refusal to carry ESN's channels violated 42 USC §1981(a), which guarantees "[a]ll persons . . . the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens." At the pleading stage, the case turned on which causation standard to use. The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs had to point to facts plausibly showing that racial animus was a "but for" cause of the defendant’s conduct. The 9th Circuit reversed, holding that a plaintiff must only plead facts plausibly showing that race played "some role" in the defendant’s decisionmaking process.

The US Supreme Court unanimously held that a §1981 plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the plaintiff’s race was a but-for cause of its injury, and that burden remains constant over the life of the lawsuit. The Court said, "It is 'textbook tort law' that a plaintiff seeking redress for a defendant’s legal wrong typically must prove but-for causation," and there is no exception for §1981. Although Congress in 1991 adopted a "motivating factor" causation test for Title VII cases, §1981 dates back to 1866 and has never said a word about motivating factors.

NLRB suspends elections - COVID-19

March 19, 2020 press release from the NLRB:

Due to the extraordinary circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the National Labor Relations Board [on March 19] approved the suspension of all representation elections, including mail ballot elections, for the next two weeks effective immediately, through and including April 3, 2020.

The Board deems this action necessary to ensure the health and safety of our employees, as well as those members of the public who are involved in the election process. Moreover, given the closure of several Regional Offices and limited operations and significant telework at others, the Board does not believe that it is possible to effectively conduct elections at this time.

The Board will continue to monitor this evolving situation and determine whether additional extension of this suspension may be necessary.

I expect this will last much longer than two weeks. If elections resume during the next three months, I expect they will be something other than in-person balloting.

10 big changes at the NLRB - video

[VIDEO]

The NLRB has made a lot of changes since the Republicans gained a majority.

This video discusses my top 10.

1. email
2. Joint employer
3. Independent contractor
4. Grad students
5. Micro units
6. Workplace rules
7. Election rule
8. Class actions
9. Dues checkoff
10. Unilateral changes

Pacific Coast Labor & Employment Law Conference postponed

Pacific Coast Labor & Employment Law Conference has been postponed until September 16 & 17.  See announcement at https://pacificlaborlaw.com/

Prior salary and the Equal Pay Act

[Video] If starting salary is based on prior salary, that's not a defense to an Equal Pay Act suit. So says the 9th Circuit in an en banc (11 judges) decision: Rizo v. Yovino (9th Cir 02/27/2020) [PDF].

Setting initial wages based on prior wages is always problematic because it tends to perpetuate the discrimination that might have been practiced by previous employers to the disadvantage of women and racial minorities.

Now, we've got a 9th Circuit case saying that an employer cannot ever use prior wages to justify a pay differential between men and women which otherwise would violate the Equal Pay Act.

A woman was paid less than men who were doing the same job and the employer said Look, the Equal Pay Act has a defense. It's called any other factor other than sex, and we put her on the pay schedule based on her prior salary, and that is an other factor other than sex.

And the 9th Circuit says No. The other factor has to be job related, and prior salary is not job related.

My issue with this case, which we’ll see discussed in the Supreme Court, is that the statute says ANY other factor other than sex, and the statute does not say anything at all about that other factor having to be job related.

NLRB's new joint-employer rule - video

[Video] Under the NLRB’s new rule, a finding of joint-employer status will be based on control - actual, direct, and immediate control.

SCOTUS: "Actual knowledge" means actual knowledge

The US Supreme Court can get behind being unanimous when faced with a statutory phrase that is written in "plain and unambiguous statutory language."

Intel Corp Committee v. Sulyma (US Supreme Ct 02/26/2020) [PDF] dealt with a statute of limitations that began to run when the plaintiff had “actual knowledge” of an alleged breach. The Court held that “actual knowledge” means …. well …. actual knowledge.

ERISA §1113(2) requires plaintiffs with "actual knowledge" of an alleged fiduciary breach to file suit within three years of gaining that knowledge, rather than within the 6-year period that would otherwise apply.

Sulyma sued ERISA plan administrators alleging that they had managed the plans imprudently, and the administrators argued that Sulyma filed suit more than three years after they had disclosed their investment decisions to him. Although Sulyma had visited the website that hosted many of these disclosures many times, he testified that he did not remember reviewing the relevant disclosures and that he had been unaware of the allegedly imprudent investments while working at Intel.

The 9th Circuit held that the administrators were not entitled to summary judgment because Sulyma's testimony created a dispute as to when he gained "actual knowledge" for purposes of §1113(2).

The US Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, and held that a plaintiff does not necessarily have "actual knowledge" under §1113(2) of the information contained in disclosures that he receives but does not read or cannot recall reading. To meet §1113(2)’s "actual knowledge" requirement, the plaintiff must in fact have become aware of that information. This is based on ERISA’s "plain and unambiguous statutory language." To have "actual knowledge" of a piece of information, one must in fact be aware of it.

NLRB: Joint Employer final rule

The NLRB has announced that it will issue its final rule on the standard for determining joint-employer status under the National Labor Relations Act on February 26. The final rule will guide the NLRB and those covered by the NLRA in determining whether a business is a joint employer of employees directly employed by another employer. [Text of the Final Rule]

Following is the NLRB's explanation of the Final Rule:

IMPACT OF THE FINAL RULE

A joint employer finding has significant implications for rights and obligations under the NLRA relative to collective bargaining, strike activity, and unfair labor practice liability.

• If the employees are represented by a union, the joint employer must participate in collective bargaining over their terms and conditions of employment.

• Picketing directed at a joint employer that would otherwise be secondary and unlawful is primary and lawful.

• Each business comprising the joint employer may be found jointly and severally liable for the other’s unfair labor practices.

Because of these important consequences, the purposes of the NLRA are not furthered by drawing into a collective-bargaining relationship, or exposing to secondary coercion and joint- and-several liability, a direct employer’s business partner that does not actively participate in decisions setting employees’ wages, benefits, and other essential terms and conditions of employment.

JOINT-EMPLOYER STANDARD OVERVIEW

The Final Rule:

• Specifies that a business is a joint employer of another employer’s employees only if the two employers share or codetermine the employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment;

• Clarifies the list of essential terms and conditions: wages, benefits, hours of work, hiring, discharge, discipline, supervision, and direction;

• Provides that to be a joint employer, a business must possess and exercise such substantial direct and immediate control over one or more essential terms and conditions of employment of another employer’s employees as would warrant a finding that the business meaningfully affects matters relating to the employment relationship;

• Specifies that evidence of indirect and contractually reserved but never exercised control over essential terms and conditions, and of control over mandatory subjects of bargaining other than essential terms and conditions, is probative of joint-employer status, but only to the extent that it supplements and reinforces evidence of direct and immediate control;

• Defines the key terms used in the final rule, including what does and does not constitute “substantial direct and immediate control” of each essential employment term;

• Makes clear that joint-employer status cannot be based solely on indirect influence or a contractual reservation of a right to control that has never been exercised.

WHY RULEMAKING?

The Board’s 2015 decision in Browning-Ferris unsettled the law in this vitally important area by holding that a company could be deemed a joint employer if its control over the essential terms and conditions of another business’s employees was merely indirect, limited and routine, or contractually reserved but never exercised. Although the Board could have addressed this issue in yet another decision, it decided to do so through rulemaking, for several reasons:

• Rulemaking provides a means to give this complex, nuanced, and vitally important issue the kind of comprehensive and detailed explication it deserves and to which the public is entitled, resulting in greater clarity and certainty of the law under the NLRA.

• More generally, although the NLRB, throughout much of its history, has done most of its work through decision-making, it possesses statutory authority to engage in rulemaking, and the current Board intends to exercise that authority where it believes—as it does here—that doing so will enable it to provide more clarity and certainty in the law it administers.

• Rather than issuing a decision based on, and potentially limited to, the specific facts of a particular case, rulemaking allows the Board to provide broader and more detailed guidance.

• Cases are typically briefed by lawyers hired by the parties. In contrast, notice-and- comment rulemaking enables everyone who wants to weigh in on an issue to do so— including those who cannot afford to hire a lawyer to write and file a brief. The NLRB received nearly 29,000 comments on the joint-employer rule it proposed in 2018. A comparison of the proposed and final rules will demonstrate that the NLRB gave those comments the serious consideration they deserved.

• Rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act is strictly prospective. Thus, employers, employees, and unions will know what is coming and can prepare accordingly.

IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE

The final joint-employer rule will go into effect April 27, 2020.

No refund of pre-Janus fair share payments

The 6th Circuit held today that a union is entitled to rely on its good faith in following existing Ohio and longstanding Supreme Court precedent permitting fair-share fees, so an objecting employee is not entitled to a refund. Lee v. Ohio Education Association (6th Cir 02/24/2020) [PDF].

In Janus v. AFSCME (2018) the US Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to compel public sector employees to pay fair share fees to their union. Now the 6th. 7th, and 9th Circuits have held that the employees cannot recover a refund of payments they made prior to the Janus decision. I did a video [here] on the two earlier decisions.

In Lee v. Ohio Education Association, Plaintiff Lee sought a refund of "fair share" fees she was required to pay to her public-sector union. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court held such fees violated the First Amendment as a form of compelled speech, Jones v. AFSCME, Council 31. The trial court granted the union's motion to dismiss, ruling that the union, as a private actor sued under 42 USC Section 1983, was entitled to rely on its good faith in following existing Ohio and longstanding Supreme Court precedent, which had expressly permitted fair-share fees.

The 6th Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's federal cause of action because the union's good-faith defense barred the claim. The court held that the trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss plaintiff's section 1983 claim because the union's reliance on existing authority satisfied the good-faith defense as a matter of law.

With respect to plaintiff's state-law conversion claim, the court found that plaintiff was contractually obligated to pay fair-share fees pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement – just as the union was obligated to collect them. It was a condition of plaintiff's employment that she pay fair-share fees. The court concluded plaintiff, therefore, had no right to ownership or possession of them at the time they were taken. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's state-law conversion claim.

Pacific Coast Labor & Employment Law Conference

Click image to view the brochure.

Consistently excellent labor and employment law program. Pacific Coast Labor & Employment Law Conference in Seattle April 30-May 1.

Here’s the brochure: [PDF]

Website: https://pacificlaborlaw.com/2020-conference/2020-registration

email: registration@pacificlaborlaw.com

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